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Abstract 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has faced significant challenges 
managing the total ownership cost (TOC), schedule, and technical performance of 
software-intensive systems. These challenges will continue to grow as proposed, 
and future systems will depend on software for an ever-increasing portion of system 
functionality, requiring the development of larger and more complex software 
applications. In addition, the development of the envisioned tactical and strategic 
net-centric warfighting systems will require unprecedented software development 
efforts. 
This research is a continuation and consolidation of previous research 
projects conducted for the US Navy Open Architecture Task Force.  That previous 
research is identified and cited where appropriate. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze numerous tools, techniques, and 
processes combined in a unique way to provide more predictability and control to the 
software development within the restrictive DOD Acquisition Management System. 
The tools and analyses include the Software Engineering Institute’s Quality 
Attribution Workshop (QAW), the MUIRS (maintainability, upgradability, 
interoperability, reliability, and safety/security) analysis methodology, SEI’s 
Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodologysm (ATAMsm), Logistics Supportability 
Analysis (LSA), and the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA). In 
addition, the concept of software Management Readiness Levels (MgtRLs) are 
introduced as a more useful risk reduction technique as compared to the software 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) currently used. 
This research demonstrates how the combined tools, analyses, and 
processes address the most common DOD software-intensive system 
developmental issues in a unique and holistic way. Although each tool, analysis 
technique, and process has individual utility and is value-added, this research 
demonstrates how the combined use produces a synergistic solution to the software 
component development control and produces significantly more predictability in the 
program management realm. 
The research conclusions and recommendations are designed to provide 
current and future DOD Program Managers with the combined tools, analyses, and 
processes within a conceptual implementation scheme that will provide more control 
and predictability to software-intensive systems development. Due to the TOC and 
architectural design focus, system sustainability costs are thoroughly addressed and 
actively managed. 
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Executive Summary 
The Department of Defense (DOD) has faced significant challenges 
managing the total ownership cost (TOC), schedule, and technical performance of 
software intensive systems. These challenges will continue to grow as proposed, 
and future systems will depend on software for an ever-increasing portion of system 
functionality, requiring the development of larger and more complex software 
applications. In addition, the development of the envisioned tactical and strategic 
net-centric warfighting systems will require unprecedented software development 
efforts. 
This research is a continuation and consolidation of previous research 
projects conducted for the US Navy Open Architecture Task Force.  That previous 
research is identified and cited where appropriate. 
The purpose of this research is to analyze numerous tools, techniques, and 
processes combined in a unique way to provide more predictability and control to the 
software development within the restrictive DOD Acquisition Management System. 
The tools and analyses include the Software Engineering Institute’s Quality 
Attribution Workshop (QAW), the MUIRS (maintainability, upgradability, 
interoperability, reliability, and safety/security) analysis methodology, SEI’s 
Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodologysm (ATAMsm), Logistics Supportability 
Analysis (LSA), and the Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA). In 
addition, the concept of software Management Readiness Levels (MgtRLs) are 
introduced as a more useful risk reduction technique as compared to the software 
Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) currently used. 
This research demonstrates how the combined tools, analyses, and 
processes integrate with the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) and address the 
most common DOD software-intensive system developmental issues in a unique 
and holistic way. Although each tool, analysis technique, and process has individual 
utility and is value-added, this research demonstrates how the combined use 
produces a synergistic solution to the software component development control and 
produces significantly more predictability in the program management realm. 
The research conclusions and recommendations are designed to provide 
current and future DOD Program Managers with the combined tools, analyses, and 
processes within a conceptual implementation scheme that will provide more control 
and predictability to software-intensive systems development. Due to the TOC and 
architectural design focus, system sustainability costs are thoroughly addressed and 
actively managed. 
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Introduction 
From remotely piloted aircraft and smart bombs to autonomous 
vehicles and advanced fighter jets, software is crucial to the success of 
today’s weapon systems. Focusing solely on developing and 
maintaining military hardware is no longer an option. With shrinking 
defense budgets and increasingly complex systems, the defense 
industry and services must fight to deliver on this ambitious objective, 
the military must drastically transform its approach to software. New 
organizational structures, operating models, and tools will be essential 
to modernizing and sustaining the U.S. weapon systems. (Hagen, Hurt, 
& Sorenson, 2013, p. 31) 
Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has developed some very 
successful software-intensive systems, such as the Aegis, Tomahawk Missile, and 
F/A-18 Hornet, we continue to struggle with successfully developing like systems. 
The software development in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) continues to be 
problematic. The Government Accountability Office (GAO; 2012) stated that  
JSF software development is one of the largest and most complex 
projects in DoD history, providing essential capability, but software has 
grown in size and complexity, and is taking longer to complete than 
expected. Developing, testing, and integrating software, mission 
systems, and logistics systems are critical for demonstrating the 
operational effectiveness and suitability of a fully integrated, capable 
aircraft and pose significant technical risks moving forward. (p. 7) 
The report goes on to state, “This program [JSF] has modified the software 
development and integration schedule several times, in each instance lengthening 
the time needed to complete work” (GAO, 2012, p. 11) The results of the software 
development problems have contributed to a two-year delay and increased costs of 
about one billion dollars. 
When software-intensive systems encounter developmental problems, it is 
easy to see the symptoms: schedule overruns, acquisition cost overruns, systems 
delivered with less capability than desired, and unaffordable software sustainment 
costs. The actual causes of the visible symptoms are often much more difficult to 
determine.  
Cost and schedule overruns in software development are often the result of 
poor initial software size estimates and unforeseen software redesign. In the case of 
the JSF,  
The lines of code necessary for the JSF’s capabilities have now grown 
to over 24 million—9.5 million on board the aircraft. By comparison, 
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JSF has about 3 times more on-board software lines of code than the 
F-22A Raptor and 6 times more than the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet. 
This has added work and increased the overall complexity of the effort. 
The software on-board the aircraft and needed for operations has 
grown 37 percent since the critical design review in 2005 … almost half 
of the on-board software has yet to complete integration and test – 
typically the most challenging phase of software development. (GAO, 
2012, p. 11) 
The report goes on to state that typical software size growth in DoD systems 
development ranges from 30% to 100%.  
JSF design changes were originally supposed to taper off and be completed 
by January 2014. Actual design changes through September 2011 failed to taper off 
and continue at a significantly high rate. The projections in the GAO (2012) report 
indicated that the revised design change projections will continue, and actually grow 
in number, until January 2019 (p. 16). Given this level of redesign, the software and 
system complexity growth are likely to continue.  
Software engineers typically spend 50% or more of their total software 
development time designing software architecture, and that architecture may provide 
up to 80% of a modern weapon system’s functionality. Increasingly, these systems 
operate within a network or other system-of-systems’ architecture. Obviously, the 
requirements driving that architectural design effort are critical for achieving the 
warfighter capability sought. Managing the architectural design process (including 
tracing requirement to functions), insight into the design process, and control of the 
design effort are equally critical for the successful development of the capability 
needed by the warfighter. 
The DOD monitors and controls system technical development through 
implementation of the baselines, audits, and technical reviews within an overarching 
systems engineering process (SEP; Defense Acquisition University [DAU], 2004). 
Because of the relatively immature software engineering environment, significantly 
more analyses and development of the requirements are required. In addition, the 
software architectural design effort depends on in-depth requirements analysis, is 
resource intensive, and must occur very early in the developmental process. 
Effective management and implementation of design metrics are essential in 
developing software that meets the warfighters’ needs. This management and 
metrics effort supplements and supports the system’s technical development 
through the baselines, audits and technical reviews. 
There are numerous variations and models of the SEP. This research uses 
the model depicted in Figure 1, which illustrates the systems engineering functions 
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described throughout this paper. The concepts are transferable to the SEP “V” 
model that the DOD currently uses. 
 
Figure 1. Systems Engineering Process 
The DOD Software-Intensive System Development 
Problem and Research Technique 
Problem 
From a systems management perspective, the overarching problem is that 
the DOD Acquisition Management System produces both successful and 
unsuccessful software-intensive systems. The management oversight, structure, and 
discipline offered do not produce repeatable success in complex, software-intensive 
systems development. 
Primary Research Question 
The problem identified above drives this primary research question: Why 
does the DOD Acquisition Management System produce both successful and 
unsuccessful software-intensive systems? 
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Secondary Research Questions 
I analyze the DOD software-intensive system development challenge by 
addressing these secondary research questions: 
• Does the DOD acquisition environment provide opportunity for variable 
results in software-intensive system development? 
• How does the software engineering environment impact DOD software 
intensive system development? 
• Is the DOD requirements development and communication process 
sufficient for potential software developers? 
• How is the software-intensive system architecture developed to ensure 
warfighter capabilities are designed and prioritized? 
DOD Acquisition Environment 
At the top level, there are the three primary decision support systems used 
within the DOD, and the interaction within these systems significantly decides the 
acquisition of products or services (DOD, 2013b). The three systems are the Joint 
Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), which provides the 
acquisition requirements documents; the Defense Acquisition System (DAS), which 
provides the processes to develop and acquire the needed products to fulfill the 
requirement; and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) 
process, which is the funding resource management. Figure 2 depicts the three 
support systems. 
 
Figure 2. DOD Decision Support Systems  
(from DOD, 2013b) 
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Software-intensive systems are most impacted by the JCIDS and the DAS 
Decision Support Systems, and the PPBE process has no particularly unique impact 
on software intensive systems development. This research, therefore, focuses on 
elements of the JCIDS and DAS systems. 
Requirements Generation 
The Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) was 
designed to assess capability requirements and associated capability gaps and risks 
(Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [CJCS], 2012, p. A-1). Capability gaps may be 
identified in one or more of the following areas: Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
Materiel, Leadership Policy and Education, Personnel, Facilities, and Policy 
(DOTMLPF-P). Materiel-related capability gaps become the basis for the 
requirements process that drives the acquisition community to develop and acquire 
platforms designed to bridge all or part of the identified gap. JCIDS is designed to be 
an iterative process, beginning with a validated Initial capabilities Document (ICD), 
triggering the acquisition community to begin an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) on 
candidate systems that potentially address the capability need. The Capabilities 
Design Document (CDD) refines and adds necessary detail to support the technical 
design of the system sought. The final document in the series is the Capabilities 
Production Document (CPD), which further refines the user requirements and adds 
detail supporting the production planning for the system. Although JCIDS is 
designed to refine well-defined requirements, there is clearly an opportunity for 
requirements creep with this iterative user requirements process.  
After the user community completes each JCIDS iteration, the 
program/project/product manager (PM) or materiel developer is prompted into 
action. As stated, the ICD prompts an AoA identifying the possible systems that 
could be procured or developed to meet the capability need. The CDD is a key 
document in the requirements generation cycle and is the user community’s primary 
input for the PM’s development of the performance specification for the Request for 
Proposal (RFP). The CPD is the user’s key document for driving production 
decisions, and the PM’s production strategy is significantly influenced by the CPD. 
One of the PM’s most critical functions is developing the performance 
specification for inclusion in the RFP. This requires the PM team to translate the 
user-stated needs from capabilities-based language to performance-based language 
that is used to drive the design efforts of potential system developers, usually 
contractors. This is critical because the RFP is the basis for the potential contractors’ 
proposals containing the estimated cost, schedule, and technical performance they 
plan to achieve. The submitted proposals are evaluated and compared during the 
labor-intensive source selection process, resulting in a contract award based on 
proposal merit. If the performance specification is incomplete, vaguely stated, or 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 5 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
misunderstood, then the source selection process and contract award is based on 
incorrect proposals and the effort is significantly wasted.  
The selected contractor accepts the terms of the contract based on the assumptions 
and estimates contained in the proposal. To develop the proposal, the contractor 
translates the PM’s performance specification into a basic detailed specification so 
that the scope of work can be estimated for the proposed cost and schedule. 
Correcting these performance specification deficiencies later puts the Government at 
a significant disadvantage as the contract has been awarded and necessary 
changes to the contract are negotiated without competition. Changes, additions, or 
even clarifications to the performance specification after contract award are likely to 
impact the terms of the contract, resulting in a negative impact to the cost, schedule, 
or performance of the desired system. 
The Defense Acquisition System 
The DOD Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics Life Cycle Management 
System (known as the Horse Blanket) is the framework for control and management 
of DOD systems development, based on the SEP. As partially depicted in Figure 3, 
the model depicted features development phases that define activities, and 
milestones that serve as control and decision points. These phases and milestones 
are established very early in the development cycle using the information available 
during early Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA), which is obviously very limited. 
Overwhelmingly, the PM responsible for establishing this strategy is not the 
individual responsible for executing it. Funding requirements, including amount, type, 
and period of execution, are established in the Program Objective Memorandum 
(POM) submission and a Congressionally-approved funding profile is established for 
the entire acquisition strategy within the PPBE process. At this point, the schedule 
becomes very rigid as Congress must approve significant changes to the funding 
profile, including when the funding is to be executed. Although there are obviously 
known and unknown risks associated with an acquisition strategy formulated this 
early, there is no provision for a management reserve of funding to address these 
risks. 
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Figure 3. Defense Acquisition Management System  
(from DOD, 2013b, p. 9) 
The Interim DOD Instruction 5000.02, dated November 26, 2013, shows 
alternate versions of the DAS phases and milestones (see Figure 3) that attempt to 
address the impact that software imparts on the development process. The interim 
instruction depicts the following variants of the model: Defense Unique Software 
Intensive Program; Incrementally Fielded Software Intensive Program; Hybrid 
Program A (Hardware dominant); and Hybrid Program B (Software Dominant) 
models (DOD, 2013b, pp. 10–14). The new models indicate an understanding that 
software impacts the system development process differently than typical hardware 
systems do. As these are all newly developed, their impact on future development is 
unknown. 
 
Performance Specifications and the Work Breakdown 
Structure 
Since the implementation of acquisition reform in the nineties, detailed 
specifications have been replaced with performance specifications in order to 
leverage the considerable experience and expertise available in the defense 
contractor base. In most hardware-centric engineering disciplines, the expertise that 
the DOD seeks to leverage includes a mature engineering environment in which 
materials, standards, tools, techniques, and processes are widely accepted and 
implemented by industry leaders. This engineering maturity helps to account for 
derived and implied requirements not explicitly stated in the performance 
specification. Three levels of the work breakdown structure (WBS) may provide 
sufficient detail for vendors to develop a desired system in a mature engineering 
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environment, such as the automotive field. For example, an automotive design that 
provides for easy replacement of wear-out items such as tires, filters, belts, and 
batteries obviously provides sustainability performance that is absolutely required. 
Most performance specifications do not explicitly address this capability as they 
would be automatically considered by any competent provider within the mature 
automotive engineering environment.  
The Department of Defense Handbook: Work Breakdown Structures for 
Defense Materiel Items (MIL-HDBK-881A), recommends a minimum of three levels 
be developed before handoff to a contractor (DOD, 2005). If a program is expected 
to be high-cost or high-risk, it is critical to define the system at a lower level of the 
WBS (DOD, 2005, p. 3). Complex weapon systems are nearly always high-cost, and 
the complex software development that these systems require almost always means 
that the development effort is high-risk as well. The WBS and performance 
specification must, consequently, be significantly more developed to provide the 
software engineer enough information and insight to accurately estimate the level of 
effort needed—cost and schedule—and to actually produce the capabilities needed 
by the warfighter. Contracts resulting from proposals that are based on 
underdeveloped, vague, or missing requirements typically result in catastrophic cost 
and schedule growth as the true demands of the software development effort are 
discovered only after contract award. 
The WBS provides the basis for the vendors’ performance specification. It is 
also a powerful communications medium with potential contractors, as its upper 
levels provide a functional system breakdown structure from the DOD’s perspective. 
The same WBS continues to be developed by the contractor, eventually providing 
the detailed breakdown structure: the basis for the cost and scheduling estimates 
provided in the proposals and used in the Earned Value Management (EVM) metrics 
during execution. 
Technology Readiness Assessment and Risk Management 
Another important management aspect is addressing the readiness of the key 
technologies for successful development and deployment. A Technology Readiness 
Assessment (TRA) is required for most Major DOD Acquisition Programs (MDAPs; 
DOD, 2011, p. 1-1) The purpose for conducting a TRA is to address the risk of 
attempting to develop a system with a key technology that is too immature to 
successfully deploy the system when needed by the warfighter. To benchmark the 
assessment, Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) have been developed in a nine-
level model, with a goal of ensuring that a system’s key technologies achieve at 
least a TRL level 6 to reduce risk to an acceptable level. 
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There are software TRLs established, and level 6 is defined as “Module 
and/or subsystem validation in a relevant end-to-end environment.” The level 6 
description specifies the “level at which the engineering feasibility of a software 
technology is demonstrated. This level extends the laboratory prototype 
implementations on full-scale realistic problems in which the software technology is 
partially integrated with existing hardware/software systems” (Blanchette, Albert, & 
Garcia-Miller, 2010, p. 35). 
The software TRL level 6 description presents several problems in performing 
the TRA on a software-intensive system. Weapon system software is typically 
engineered from scratch with few reused elements, which means that there is very 
little to nothing on which to perform the assessment. There will likely be software 
developed for similar systems that would meet the level 6 description, but assessing 
like-software built for another system will not significantly reduce the software 
technology risk of the proposed system. For example, the F-35 is built by the same 
manufacturer as the F-22, and they are both high-performance military aircraft with 
different but overlapping missions. Yet the F-35 is experiencing more software 
development problems than its predecessor and already has three times more 
software than the F-22 (Hagan et al., 2013, p. 26). 
Software TRLs do not appear to be providing the same type readiness 
indicator as hardware-related TRLs, leaving software technology risks substantially 
unknown. In a 2010 U.S. Army workshop report from the Software Engineering 
Institute (SEI), the participants noted that “though marginally useful, these efforts 
have only confirmed for the participants the futility of continuing to base [technology] 
readiness decisions for software aspects of systems on the DoD software TRLs” 
(Blanchette et al., 2010, p. 2). The software TRLs clearly do not seem to be effective 
at reducing risk for the TRA. 
To help with early risk management in lieu of effective software TRLs, a 
software developer maturity assessment is mandated for most software-intensive 
systems, through attaining level 3 in the SEI’s Capability Maturity Model Integrated 
(CMMI), or equivalent, assessment methodology (DOD, 2013a, p. 92) The concept 
recognizes that the software build is a product of the process, and more mature 
organizations—those with successful past performance, demonstrated engineering 
discipline, stable development staffs, and effective management structures—reduce 
system development risk. 
SEI also has the Software Acquisition Capability Maturity Model® (SA-CMM), 
which is designed to evaluate the maturity of software acquiring organizations such 
as the DOD’s software-intensive system PM offices (Cooper & Fisher, 2002). The 
SA-CMM is also a five-level model, similar to the CMMI. The DOD currently has no 
requirement for PM offices to undergo an evaluation or achieve any SA-CMM level, 
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but the maturity of the team responsible for communicating the system requirements 
and managing the development has an impact on risk. 
Findings Summary 
In summary, the DOD acquisition environment features a requirements flow-
down process that involves user-stated capabilities-based requirements translated to 
performance-based requirements, then translated to the detailed design 
specifications. This requirements translation process is the basis for the resource-
intensive source selection and binding contracting processes, which are critical for 
accurate cost and schedule estimates. Although DOD acquisition is based on the 
event-driven SEP, the schedule becomes rigid very early in the process when time-
specific funding is attached. The subsequent system PMs are charged with 
managing the cost, schedule, and performance set by the initial PM with no funding 
provided for managing the associated risk. To reduce risk, PMs are directed to 
perform TRAs early in the process, with a goal of achieving at least TRL 6 on key 
technologies. Software TRLs do not appear to be effective, and software developer 
maturity assessments are conducted to help reduce system development risk. The 
latest Interim DOD Instruction 5000.02 (DOD, 2013a) depicts newer phases and 
milestone models that attempt to address the differences that software development 
causes in the management of the DAS. 
DOD Acquisition Environment Analysis 
Does the DOD acquisition environment provide opportunity for variable 
results in software-intensive system development? 
The DOD acquisition environment appears to remain vulnerable to significant 
variability when developing software-intensive systems, similar to the problems 
currently plaguing the F-35 JSF program. Although the new phases and milestones 
models address the software component development, other critical management 
functions remain unchanged. Requirements generation, performance specification 
development, RFP, source selection, and contracting processes have yet to adapt to 
the unique challenges presented when managing software-intensive system 
development. Early program risk management assesses key technology readiness, 
but the software TRLs are ineffective for predicting software development risk. 
Evaluating the software developer’s maturity helps reduce some risk but fails to 
include the critical DOD entities in any maturity assessment. 
The challenges software components present within a DOD system 
development effort are being recognized, and the software-oriented phases and 
milestone models appearing in the interim DODI 5000.02 represent a beginning to 
addressing those challenges. The new models depict the iterative nature of the 
software builds and how the phases and milestones may adapt depending on how 
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software intensive the system may be. The other critical functions and processes 
within the Defense Acquisition Management System do not appear to be adapting to 
the software challenges. The requirements generation system is key and will be 
addressed in detail later in this research, but it doesn’t appear to have changed 
significantly. As discussed earlier, those requirements generated through the system 
are the drivers and the basis for other critical, early systems analysis and 
communication. The performance specification, RFP, contractor proposal 
generation, source selection, and contracting processes remain essentially 
unchanged. 
Early risk management through the TRA and achieving a desired TRL is 
ineffective for the software component. Assessing the contractor (software 
developer) maturity through CMMI or equivalent evaluation appears to be effective in 
reducing the developer risk but does not address the DOD acquisition community 
maturity. As the software developer is significantly dependent on the Government’s 
ability to effectively generate and clearly communicate a comprehensive set of 
requirements, quality attributes, and critical design elements, assessing just the 
developer’s maturity addresses only part of the risk. 
Software Engineering Environment 
Software Engineering  
The software engineering environment is not mature, especially when 
compared to hardware-centric engineering environments. Dr. Philippe Kruchten 
(2005) of the University of British Columbia remarks, “We haven’t found the 
fundamental laws of software that would play the role that the fundamental laws of 
physics play for other engineering disciplines” (p. 17). Software engineering is 
significantly unbounded because there are no physical laws that help define 
environments. There is significant evidence for software engineering immaturity, and 
it is nearly impossible to find widely accepted, industry-wide development standards, 
protocols, architectures, or formats. There is no dominant programming language, 
design and development process, standard architectures, or software engineering 
tools, which means that reusable modules and components rapidly become 
obsolete. All of these combine to make it nearly impossible to institute a widely 
accepted software reuse repository. Without significant software architecture and 
code reuse in developing software-intensive weapon systems, each development 
process essentially starts from scratch. This fact is one of the main reasons that the 
TRA and the software TRLs are ineffective in predicting software development risk 
(Naegle & Petross, 2007). 
The software engineering state-of-the-practice currently is wholly dependent 
on the requirements that are passed to the software development team. From the 
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requirements, a software architecture is designed, and the requirements “flow down” 
through that architecture to the individual modules and computer software units that 
are to be constructed. The software build focuses on the requirements that flowed 
down to that level and the integration required for functionality. The standards, 
protocols, formats, languages, and tools used for the build will likely be unique to the 
contractor developing the software, and will most certainly not be universally 
accepted or recognized across the software industry. 
The software architectural design is the basis for all of the current and future 
system performance that the system will achieve, and the current state-of-the-
practice in software engineering has each project design a unique architecture. Like 
hardware, the software design will significantly impact system attributes that are 
important to the warfighter, including maintainability, upgradability, interoperability, 
reliability, safety, and security. Most hardware-oriented engineering environments 
address these critical areas through widely accepted industry standards. For 
example, all DOD ground combat vehicles use a 24 volt, direct current, negative 
ground electrical system. Any current or future subsystem requiring vehicle power 
will automatically be designed to operate using those industry-wide electrical power 
standards. 
Comparison to Mature Engineering 
The software engineering environment is in stark contrast to even our most 
advanced hardware-centric engineering environments. For example, in the 
automotive engineering field, a design that provides for easy replacement of wear-
out items such as tires, filters, belts, and batteries obviously provides sustainability 
performance that is absolutely required. This engineering maturity helps account for 
derived and implied requirements not explicitly stated in the performance 
specification. Most performance specifications do not explicitly address this 
capability because they would be automatically considered by any competent 
provider within the mature automotive engineering environment. A mature 
engineering environment includes design elements and industry-wide standards, 
processes, materials, and techniques to which we have grown to expect. A 
significant problem will exist if we expect the software engineering environment to 
perform the same way as other, more mature engineering fields (Naegle & Petross, 
2007). 
As the example above illustrates, system sustainability elements are often 
standardized across hardware-oriented engineering environments. Without the 
engineering maturity, software sustainability performance and expectations must be 
specified as part of the requirements generation process. The capabilities-based 
user requirements and performance-based acquisition requirements are specifically 
not designed to provide that level of specificity.  
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Findings Summary 
With software, virtually all of the performance and quality attributes developed 
come directly from the requirements received, and the immature software 
engineering environment will likely not compensate for any desired performance, 
such as system sustainability, that is not clearly specified in a requirement. Unlike 
hardware-oriented engineering environments, where the widely accepted industry 
standards will be employed whether or not they are specified, with software, you get 
what you specify and very little else. 
The software architectural designs suffer from the immature engineering 
environment as well. Each software design is unique and driven by the requirements 
received with no industry-standard architectures available. All current and future 
system attributes impacted by the architecture must be communicated to the 
software design staff to ensure they are considered in the design process. 
Software Engineering Environment Analysis 
How does the software engineering environment impact DOD software-
intensive system development? 
As illustrated in the previous section, the lack of software engineering maturity 
impacts both requirements development and design of the architecture. To 
compensate for the relative immaturity of the software engineering environment, the 
DOD must conduct significantly more in-depth requirements analysis and provide 
potential software developers detailed performance specifications in all areas of 
software performance and sustainability. This is a significantly different mind-set 
than the hardware-dominated systems acquisition of the past. 
In addition to the performance requirements, software architectures must be 
similarly shaped to include system attributes expected by the warfighter. Many DOD 
user representatives and acquisition professionals have grown accustom to the 
engineering maturity levels offered by the hardware-oriented systems that 
dominated past acquisitions. Providing the system requirements in the same fashion 
may not drive the architecture for needed attributes. As demonstrated by the F-35 
JSF redesign problems, changing software architectures during the development 
cycle will likely be costly in terms of schedule and funding. 
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DOD Acquisition Environment: Impact on Software 
Development and Quality Attributes 
DOD Requirements Generation Process 
The DOD requirements generation process was described earlier as part of 
the DOD acquisition environment and consists of three major processes: user-
generated requirements in the form of capability needs using the JCIDS; PM-
generated requirements in the form of performance specifications; and finally, 
contractor-generated detailed specifications, developed generally in that order. Two 
major requirements language interpretations are required to get from the warfighters’ 
needs to the system built to meet those needs, leaving significant opportunity for 
misinterpretation, omission, and misunderstanding of weakly articulated and vaguely 
stated language. To do this effectively, the PM must accurately interpret user 
capability language (as an example, warfighter requires the capability to … in all 
mission environments) and translate that into performance language (system shall 
achieve xxx performance … in these specific conditions, for example). The 
contractor then translates the performance language into the system build-details 
that meet or exceed the performance specified. 
The importance of system software requirements development to the 
potential success of software-intensive systems development cannot be overstated. 
Underdeveloped, vaguely articulated, ill-defined software requirements elicitation 
has been linked to poor cost and schedule estimations, resulting in disastrous cost 
and schedule overruns such as what the F-35 JSF is currently experiencing. In 
addition, the resulting products have been lacking important functionality, are 
unreliable, and have been costly and difficult to effectively sustain (Naegle, 2006). 
Systems Engineering Process 
Using the SEP approach, the explicit user capabilities requirements specified 
in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS) provides the 
input for system requirements analyses. These analyses are intended to illuminate 
all system-stated, -derived, and -implied requirements and quality attributes 
necessary to achieve the capabilities needed by the warfighter. The WBS is a 
methodology for defining ever-increasing levels of performance specificity using the 
SEP to guide the development of each successive layer (DOD, 2005, pp. 1–5). 
Just as it supports hardware development, the Systems Engineering 
Process (SEP) is essential in the development of software design. In 
software development, good quality and predictable results are 
paramount goals in creating the specified warfighter capabilities within 
cost and schedule constraints. To accomplish those goals, we examine 
the methods, tools and processes the software developer uses in 
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building the software with the intent of attaining a product that provides 
all of the necessary functionality and is supportable, efficient, reliable 
and easy to upgrade. (Naegle & Petross, 2007, pp. 14, 15) 
Work Breakdown Structure  
In previous research conducted by Ms. Diana Petross and me, we addressed 
the WBS in detail: 
The Government’s requirements and specifications for a new weapon 
system are detailed in the RFP; this includes a Government-produced 
Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) (composed of at least three levels). 
This is known as the Program WBS and is handed off to the contractor 
to develop a WBS that defines the level of detail required for product 
development. This contractor-generated product will ensure the system 
developer understands the program objectives and the products to be 
delivered in performance of the contract. The WBS details the 
functionality and performance of the system and provides a baseline to 
track performance against cost and schedule. For most hardware-
centric programs, a WBS for the top three levels of the system under 
development is usually enough detail to manage the program. 
Because of the volatile nature of software development, immature 
software engineering environment, and the potential impact to cost, 
schedule and risk, the WBS for software-intensive programs needs to 
be developed down to Level 5 or lower—including system-of-systems 
(SOS) and net-centric systems development.  
Level 1 of the WBS describes the entire project. If the program is a 
systems-of-systems (SOS) project, Level I becomes that overarching 
system. For instance, the Army Future Combat System (FCS) had a 
number of platforms that were segments of the total system. Each 
platform becomes a major segment of that product (Level 2); the 
software development would then be broken down to Level 6, which 
identifies software-configuration items.  
 Using the FCS as an example, Level 1 describes the overall FCS 
concept and environment. Level 2 details the major product segments 
of the SOS. In our example of the FCS, the Level 2 would be the 
platforms, i.e., infantry-carrier vehicles, command vehicles, mounted 
combat systems, etc.  
Level 3 defines the major components (or subsets) of Level 2. For 
software development, decomposition of the software WBS to the 
lowest component is critical for the developer to fully comprehend the 
detailed level of effort required to design and develop effective 
systems. Under the FCS scenario, Level 3 would be one of the 
subsystems onboard the manned systems, e.g., the fire-control 
systems and environmental-control systems. It is clear that WBS 
definition to this level provides only a very top-level insight to the 
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system being developed; thus, for the software-intensive system, the 
WBS fails to convey enough information for the contractor to propose a 
realistic cost and schedule estimate. Too much of the software 
development work is hidden at this level. 
Level 4 becomes a breakout of the component parts of the subsystem. 
Using a manned vehicle in the FCS program, Level 5 of the WBS 
would identify the component functions for the fire-control system: for 
example, detect the target, aim at the target and fire the munitions. The 
software build-set would support the functionality of that component 
within the subsystem. Again, using the FCS as the overarching 
program, Level 6 is a sum of software items (SI’s) which satisfy a 
required function and are designated for configuration management. If 
the software requirements or attributes are well defined, the result is a 
product that is properly designed to functionally perform to the users’ 
requirements. Further development below Level 6 may be necessary 
to adequately convey the derived and implied requirements to the 
software developer. (Naegle & Petross, 2007, pp. 13, 14) 
Software Engineering Maturity Impact on Requirements 
Generation 
The immature software engineering environment, discussed earlier, can be 
compensated for only by a requirements generation system that does not leave any 
gaps in performance or quality attributes needed. Having all of the requirements 
clearly communicated is critical, but the software engineer must also understand the 
requirements in context. For example, the M1A2 Abrams main battle tank uses 
numerous inputs for precisely engaging threat targets. Several such inputs are 
essential for any acceptable probability of hitting the desired target, including target 
acquisition (finding the target), location (azimuth and range), aiming/tracking, and 
firing the projectile. To increase accuracy, several other systems are employed that 
enhance one or more of the essential functions, including cross-wind sensor, 
temperature sensor, muzzle-reference system, and others (Naegle, 2007, p. 18). 
Both essential and enhancing features are communicated to the system and 
software developers as requirements and, as such, appear to have equal weight. 
The critical difference between “essential” and “enhancing” may not be clear to the 
software development team, which may result in a poorly performing and possibly 
dangerous design. For example, as actually happened in M1 Abrams testing, the 
temperature sensor malfunctioned and was reporting a temperature of 2,000 
degrees Fahrenheit, well outside of the expected range, creating an “exception.” The 
software engineers had designed the software to abort firing in the event of any 
exception and, of course, the warfighter needs the system to have the ability to fight 
if any or all of the enhancing functions fail. The distinction needs to be made clear, 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 16 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
but there is no definitive method for identifying requirements as system “essential” or 
“enhancing.” 
System Operational Context 
To gain some insight into the operational environments that the system is 
expected to operate within, the DOD provides an Operational Mode 
Summary/Mission Profile (OMS/MP). The OMS/MP provides some basic insight into 
the operational profile, threat profile, environmental profile, and the terrain/sea 
state/undersea/air environment profile, which adds some context to the 
requirements, but is not usually scenario based. It typically lacks sustainability 
activities, interoperability profiles, system life-cycle profiles, planned or anticipated 
upgrades, or operation in stressful, degraded, or emergency situations. 
The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), replacing the High Mobility Multi-
purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) family of vehicles, is a multi-mission platform. 
The JLTV program OMS/MP (version 3.3) dated January 12, 2012. Under paragraph 
1.2, Document Overview, it explains what the JLTV OMS/MP defines, including 
• Expected operational modes 
• Full spectrum operations, operational themes, and elements of the 
operational terms (offense, defense, and stability) 
• Joint mission profiles and operational elements 
• Terrain conditions in terms of mileage, speed, and roughness 
• Environmental conditions (DOD, 2012, p. 3)  
Obviously, a significant amount of mission and system information is omitted. 
The details regarding the following items are not provided: 
• System mission configuration (JLTV is a multi-mission platform) 
• Number of personnel 
• Personnel equipment and supplies required 
• Cargo/hauling capacity 
• Interoperability requirements 
o Communications and network equipment 
o Situational awareness systems 
o Weapons 
o Trailers/towed systems 
o Special missions equipment (e.g., chemical weapons detection) 
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o Electric power requirements for integrated equipment 
• Crew maintenance tasks and frequency 
• Survivability considerations 
As with this JLTV OMS/MP, the documents typically do not provide much 
information on operations under stressful, degraded, or unusual conditions, which 
would provide critical design cues for the software engineers. There is no 
prioritization of the operational modes or configurations, nor identification of critical 
and non-critical systems.  
The software development team would likely continue to be missing important 
information that they need to adequately design the software and to predict the 
funding and schedule resources necessary to build the software the warfighter 
expects. The JLTV OMS/MP was specifically created for the Engineering and 
Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase. In paragraph 1.1, Purpose, it states,  
This OMS/MP describes system modes, mission profiles, and usage 
conditions for the JLTV during its operating life. When approved, it 
supersedes the OMS/MP published with the JLTV Request for 
Proposal (RFP) in February 2008, but will not take effect until JLTV 
EMD phase activities. The OMS/MP supports the basis for essential 
capabilities described in the JLTV Capability Development Document 
(CDD) documenting key usage factors directly applicable to design 
study, logistical analyses, O&S [operations and support] estimation, 
and reliability, availability, and maintainability (RAM) testing and 
analyses. (DOD, 2012 p. 3) 
The OMS/MP documents do not typically provide any information regarding 
system life-cycle changes such as pre-planned product improvement (P3I) 
programs, planned upgrades and technology refreshments, future interoperability 
requirements, or plans for future integration into tactical and logistical networks. 
These life-cycle events, while known or anticipated, are not effectively 
communicated to potential developers for inclusion in the proposal process and are 
often omitted from the software system design.  
The JLTV OMS/MP was selected because the JLTV (a HMMWV 
replacement) is a system that is easy for nearly all readers to comprehend, and it is 
obviously not a software-intensive system. The analysis of this system is intended to 
illustrate that the typical OMS/MP provides only the basic insight into even the most 
basic system to be developed, and relies heavily on DOD acquisition professionals 
to ensure that the contractor has a sufficient understanding of the operational role, 
quality attributes, system life-cycle changes, and expected operation in stressful or 
degraded modes to adequately design and produce to the warfighter’s expectations. 
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Impact on Software and Quality Attributes Analysis 
Is the DOD requirements development and communication process sufficient 
for potential software developers? 
The DOD requirements generation process that was purposefully designed to 
garner the maximum contractor innovation and flexibility appears to provide too little 
information for the software developer to adequately predict the resources 
necessary to develop the system software. It is clear that the current state of the 
software engineering environment is mostly incapable of compensating for missing, 
vaguely stated, or weakly articulated requirements. At the same time, the current 
DOD requirements generation system provides ample opportunity to inadvertently 
omit requirements and to provide vaguely stated or weakly articulated requirements 
through the capabilities-oriented JCIDS documents and the performance-based 
specifications derived from them.  
Without fully understanding the requirements in a detailed operational 
context, the software design and development effort and resources remain 
significantly unknown. The typical OMS/MP provides some operational context to the 
requirements, but is not sufficiently detailed to provide the design drivers needed by 
the software engineers. Developing a proposal with this limited information will likely 
result in a significantly underestimated software development effort. After contract 
award, more operational details are typically provided through program and design 
reviews, and the cost and schedule for the software effort are likely to inflate 
significantly to accommodate the new understanding of the requirement in a non-
competitive environment. 
The lack of operational context typically provided by the Government during the RFP 
process appears to have significant negative impacts on the software design for 
reliability and maintainability. The OMS/MP documents’ lack of information regarding 
significant planned and anticipated life-cycle changes, system sustainment activities 
and burden, and operations under unusual conditions will likely mean that the 
system software design will not easily accommodate known changes. There is no 
prioritization of the operational modes or configurations that would impact system 
design considerations. This information would also help differentiate critical systems 
from enhancing (non-critical) systems, providing a priority in the software design 
effort. 
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Software-Intensive System Architecture Development 
Analysis 
How is the software-intensive system architecture developed to ensure 
warfighter capabilities are designed and prioritized? 
The DOD system architectural process, with all of its tools, techniques, and 
discipline, appears to be ineffective in driving repeatable, successful software 
designs. Within the SEP, there are three DOD processes that drive the system 
architecture: the requirements generations system, the WBS, and the OMS/MP. 
This research has previously analyzed how that process is not effective in 
providing repeatable, effective software-related requirements detail. The DOD 
requirements generation process develops system requirements within the SEP, 
culminating in the system performance specification and included in the RFP. There 
appears to be significant opportunity to omit requirements, or to provide vague or 
weakly articulated requirements through the translation process from the user 
capability-based requirements, to the PM’s performance specification, and finally to 
the contractor’s detailed specification. This problem is exacerbated by the immature 
software engineering environment described earlier, which is solely focused on 
requirements as provided. 
The process of developing the WBS appears to be similarly flawed in 
effectively communicating the functional architecture to a sufficient level for the 
software developers. The requirements are developed in concert with the system 
WBS, which is a primary tool for communicating functional architecture from the 
DOD perspective. After the DOD has completed its portion of the WBS, it is handed 
off to the contractor to complete the effort by developing the detailed WBS to the 
lowest level deemed necessary to code and build the software units. The 
overarching philosophy for both requirements generation and the WBS, in order to 
garner the maximum flexibility and innovation, is purposely not to be specific. Due to 
the immature engineering environment, the software components need significantly 
more specificity than the hardware counterparts to produce realism in the cost and 
schedule provided in the contractor’s proposal. 
The operational context information that the Government provides appears to 
be insufficient for the potential software developers to have an understanding of the 
requirements within the context of the operational environment, constraints, and life-
cycle events of the proposed system. The OMS/MP typically provides only a vague 
understanding of the operational environment and significantly more information is 
required to design and build the system actually needed by the warfighter. This 
additional information is likely to be added in program and design reviews conducted 
after the contract is awarded, so resulting changes impacting the software 
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development can cause significant increases in the cost and schedule, all negotiated 
without the advantages of a competitive environment. 
Conclusions 
The DOD acquisition process provides the environment for both successful 
and unsuccessful software-intensive systems development. Specific elements of the 
DOD acquisition process that contribute to the variable environment include the 
following: 
• The DOD Requirements Generation Process. The translation 
process from JCIDS capabilities-based language to the RFP/contract 
performance-based language, and finally to the specification-based 
detailed language creates ample opportunity for misinterpreted 
requirements to be communicated. This process was designed to 
garner innovation from mature engineering fields that leverage widely 
accepted materials, processes, and standards—attributes that the 
software engineering field does not yet have. 
• Communicating Operational Context. The Operational Mode 
Summary/ Mission Profile (OMS/MP) provides some insight into a 
system’s intended operational context but provides far too little 
information for the complex software design process. This lack of 
detail, again, cannot be compensated by the immature software 
engineering environment and so impacts software-intensive systems 
more than hardware-centric ones. 
• Failure to Compensate for the Immature Software Engineering 
Environment.  
o As demonstrated by the first two bullets, one of the major 
differences between successful and unsuccessful software-
intensive systems development is recognizing and 
compensating for the immature software environment. The DOD 
Acquisition System policies, guidelines, and controls do not 
provide a framework to ensure that essential software attributes 
are sufficiently revealed and effectively communicated to the 
contractors that will design and build the software systems. 
• The DOD Acquisition System.  
o The DAS is designed to leverage industry innovation by 
providing performance specifications that are designed to allow 
mature industrial engineering environments to develop the best-
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value technologies that meet the performance specifications. 
This is effective when the engineering environments are mature 
and can offer viable, mature technology alternatives that are 
considered industry-standard. There are insufficient DAS 
processes for recognizing and compensating for immature 
engineering environments, such as exists in the software field. 
o The schedule and funding profile are initially set by the first 
system PM, and the program depends significantly on how well 
the requirements generation process accurately identified the 
bulk of the requirements. Once funding is linked to milestones, 
the program cost and schedule become very rigid, which 
exacerbates problems with software-intensive system 
developments that have late requirements creep due to 
insufficient understanding of the effort in the proposal 
preparation.  
o Software Technology Readiness Levels (TRLs) are ineffective in 
reducing risks associated with the system software 
development. Because there are few reusable software 
components, limited industry-wide standards for architecture 
and supportability, and rapidly emerging languages, protocols 
and tools, the software TRLs, based on past efforts, are not 
reliable predictors of software readiness. 
o Software development significantly adds to the system 
development risk. The DAS is designed to reduce development 
risk, but cannot eliminate all associated risks. Some risk is 
accepted with the expectation that the PM team will effectively 
manage those risks, yet there is no funding management 
reserve provided to do so. Any risk management mitigation 
effort that involves funding has the opportunity to create a 
cascade of management actions resulting from funding 
reductions in other planned and necessary activities. 
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As part of this research, I searched for tools, techniques, and procedures that 
would address the software-intensive system development problems and integrate 
well with the Defense Acquisition System (DAS) while supporting the Systems 
Engineering Process (SEP). The tools, techniques, and procedures recommended in 
this section are not particularly new and many programs may have used some, 
most, or all of these in the development of their systems. The major 
recommendation is that DOD formalize and institute the use of these tools, 
techniques, and procedures (or similar ones) for the development of software-
intensive systems. There would almost certainly be a benefit when applied to 
hardware-centric system development, too, and certainly there would be no 
detriment in using them for all complex system development. 
One of the findings of this research was the lack of a PM management 
reserve fund to address accepted development risks, but a significant policy and 
political change would be required to provide a management reserve in program 
funding. I believe this course of action to be unlikely, but the implementation of the 
recommendations would significantly reduce software-intensive system 
developmental volatility and risk, and reduce the need for the management reserve. 
Each of the tools, techniques, and procedures are valuable in assisting the 
systems development process, but when used together, provide a synergistic effect 
to the vital front-end analyses that directly impact the shortcomings revealed in this 
research. Implementing these tools does not require any major adjustments to the 
DAS or the SEP, and in fact become major enablers for both. 
Tools, Techniques, and Processes 
The tools, techniques, and processes are briefly described below.  
• The Software Engineering Institute’s (SEI’s) Quality Attribute 
Workshop (QAW) 
• The Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability, Reliability, & Safety 
and Security (MUIRS) analytic technique 
• The Software Engineering Institute’s Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology (ATAMsm) 
• The Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis (FMECA) 
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• Software Management Readiness Levels (MgtRL) 
Quality Attribute Workshop  
The QAW is primarily a method for more fully developing system software 
requirements and is intended to provide stakeholders’ input about their needs and 
expectations from the software (Barbacci et al., 2003, p. 1). As the system 
requirements are developed, software quality attributes are identified and become 
the basis for designing the software architecture.  
The SEI’s QAW is implemented before the software architecture has been 
created and is intended to provide stakeholder input about the needs and 
expectations from the software (Naegle, 2007). The QAW process provides a 
vehicle for keeping the combat developer and user community involved in the DOD 
acquisition process, which is a key goal of that process. In addition, the QAW 
includes scenario-building processes that are essential for the software developer to 
design the software system architecture (Barbacci et al., 2003, pp. 9–11). These 
scenarios will continue to be developed and prioritized after contract award to 
provide context to the quality attribute identified for the system.  
Although the QAW would certainly be useful after contract award, conducting 
the workshop between combat developers/users and the program management 
office before issuance of the Request for Proposal (RFP) would provide an improved 
understanding of the requirements, enhance the performance-specification 
preparation, and improve the ability of the prospective contractors to accurately 
propose the cost and schedule. This approach would support the goals of the 
System Requirements Review (SRR), which is designed to ascertain whether all 
derived and implied requirements have been sufficiently defined (Naegle & Petross, 
2007, pp. 5, 6). 
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Area Addressed  
The QAW process is primarily designed to more fully develop system 
software requirements so that the Government RFP is clearer to potential 
contractors. In turn, the resulting proposals should be more accurate and realistic, 
reducing requirements and project scope creep. 
Maintainability, Upgradability, Interoperability/Interfaces, 
Reliability, and Safety/Security Analytic Technique 
The MUIRS analytic technique is designed to provide a framework for better 
understanding of essential supportability and safety/security aspects that the 
warfighter needs and expects but often doesn’t communicate clearly with the 
capabilities-based JCIDS documents. This analytic technique helps compensate for 
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the immature software engineering environment as the MUIRS analysis illuminates 
the derived and implied requirements that the immature environment cannot.  
Much of the software supportability and safety/security performance that 
typically lacks consideration and is not routinely addressed in the software 
engineering environment can be captured through development and analysis of the 
MUIRS elements. Analyzing the warfighter requirements in a QAW framework for 
performance in each MUIRS area will help stakeholders identify software quality 
attributes that need to be communicated to potential software contractors (Naegle, 
2006, pp. 17–24). 
The MUIRS analysis assists the QAW process by focusing on those elements 
that are too often typically overlooked during the requirements generation process. 
The QAW and MUIRS analysis are critical to the software design process, discussed 
in the next section.  
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Area Addressed  
MUIRS primarily addresses the immature software engineering environment 
as it provides an analytic approach for critical sustainment and safety/security 
attributes often missing, weakly articulated, or vaguely stated in the requirements 
produced. With its capabilities and performance based requirements processes, the 
DOD significantly depends on mature engineering environments to fill the gaps left 
from the requirements generation and communication processes, but the software 
engineering environment is unable to do so. The MUIRS analysis is also an enabler 
for the QAW and ATAMsm architectural processes discussed next. 
Architectural Tradeoff Analysis Methodologysm 
The SEI’s ATAMSM is an architectural analysis tool designed to evaluate 
design decisions based on the quality attribute requirements of the system being 
developed. The methodology is a process for determining whether the quality 
attributes are achievable by the architecture as it has been conceived before 
enormous resources have been committed to that design. One of the main goals is 
to gain insight into how the quality attributes trade-off against each other (Kazman, 
Kleim, & Clements, 2000, p. 1).  
Within the SEP, the ATAM provides the critical Requirements Loop process, 
tracing each requirement or quality attribute to corresponding functions reflected in 
the software architectural design. Whether ATAM or another analysis technique is 
used, this critical SEP process must be performed to ensure that functional- or 
object-oriented designs meet all stated, derived, and implied warfighter 
requirements. In complex systems development such as weapon systems, half or 
more than half of the total software development effort is expended in the 
architectural design process. Therefore, the DOD PMs must ensure that the design 
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is addressing requirements in context and that the resulting architecture has a high 
probability of producing the specified warfighters’ capabilities described in the JCIDS 
documents. 
The ATAM focuses on quality attribute requirements, so it is critical to have 
precise characterizations for each. To characterize a quality attribute, the following 
questions must be answered: 
• What are the stimuli to which the architecture must respond? 
• What is the measurable or observable manifestation of the quality 
attribute by which its achievement is judged? 
• What are the key architectural decisions that impact achieving the 
attribute requirement? (Kazman et al., 2000, p. 5) 
The ATAM is designed to elicit the data and information needed to adequately 
address the three questions above. These questions, focused on requirements and 
quality attributes, are user-centric, and so the ATAM scenarios must be constructed 
by the user community (Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25). The methodology keys on 
scenario development in three main areas: 
• Use Case Scenarios. As the name suggests, these scenarios 
describe how the system will be used and sustained in the harshest 
environments envisioned. It includes all interoperability requirements 
and duty cycles as well. 
• Growth Scenarios. Growth scenarios focus on known and anticipated 
system change requirements over the intended life cycle. These 
scenarios include upgrades and technology refreshments planned; 
interoperability requirements, such as inclusion in future warfighting 
networks; changes in sustainment concepts, and other system 
changes expected to occur over time. 
• Exploratory Scenarios. Exploratory scenarios focus on operations in 
unusual or stressful situations. These address user expectations when 
the system is degraded or operated beyond normal limitations due to 
emergency created by combat environments. These scenarios include 
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analyses (FMECA) to identify the 
essential functions that must not fail. As important to the software 
engineers, FMECA also identifies those enhancing functions that 
should not preclude the system from functioning when that enhancing 
function is degraded or non-operational. For example, the M1 Abrams 
tank uses the ambient temperature as an enhancer to the main gun 
accuracy, but needs the ability to be fully operational in the case where 
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the ambient temperature sensor is malfunctioning. The software 
engineers need that information to properly design the software.  
Test cases are developed out of the scenarios, which firmly link the test 
program with the user requirements in the context of the scenarios. This 
methodology also helps to ensure that there are verification events for software and 
sustainment requirements, which are too often missing from the testing program. 
As you can see from Figure 4, the ATAM is an integrating function for many of 
the tools and techniques discussed here. It is designed to be an iterative process 
and would be most effective when started in early concept development, then 
continued through contract award, prototyping, and into the design review process. 
 
Figure 4. Quality Attribution Workshop and Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology Integration into Software Life-Cycle Management 
(Naegle & Petross, 2007, p. 25) 
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Areas Addressed 
The ATAM process addresses four primary problem areas: 
• The scenario development provides much more operational context 
than the typical OMS/MP provides. This level of detail helps to 
compensate for the immature software engineering environment and is 
critical for the proper design of the software architecture.  
QAW 
Acquisition Research Program 
Graduate School of Business & Public Policy - 27 - 
Naval Postgraduate School 
• The ATAM serves as a very effective software design metric function. 
With the software development team using 50% or more of the 
available resources for requirements analysis and software design 
before the Preliminary Design Review (PDR), it is critical to have an 
effective software design metrics function. Traditional software design 
metrics focus on the design complexity and do not address whether 
the design is adequate or not. ATAM directly links the user 
requirements to the system architectural design. 
• As the testing program is developed from the scenarios, it becomes 
difficult to omit any critical testing event. In addition, the software 
developer understands the tests or verification events that must be 
passed for user acceptance. 
• By integrating the MUIRS analyses into the ATAM scenario 
development, sustainability and safety/security aspects cannot easily 
be omitted from the system design. As the testing plan flows from the 
scenarios, the MUIRS design elements will have corresponding test or 
verification events identified in the test plan. 
Failure Modes and Effects Criticality Analysis 
As the title indicates, this analysis methodology is designed to identify system 
failure modes and those failures effects on the system, and ascertain the relative 
criticality of that type of failure. In his book titled Logistics Engineering and 
Management, Benjamin S. Blanchard (2004) describes FMECA as follows: 
Given a description, both in functional and physical terms, the designer 
needs to be able to evaluate a system relative to possible failures, the 
anticipated modes and expected frequency of failure, their causes, 
their consequences and impact(s) on the system overall, and areas 
where preventative measures can be initiated to preclude such failures 
in the future. (p. 275) 
He goes on to state, “The FMECA is an excellent design tool, and it can be 
applied in the development or assessment of any product or process” (Blanchard, 
2004, p. 276). 
Including FMECA scenarios with the software systems and subsystems 
provides architectural design cues to software engineers. These scenarios provide 
analysis for designing redundant systems for mission-critical elements, “safe mode” 
operations for survivability- and safety-related systems, and drive the software 
engineer to conduct “what if” analyses with a superior understanding of failure-mode 
scenarios. For example, nearly all military aircraft are “fly-by-wire,” with no physical 
connection between the pilot controls and the aircraft-control surfaces, so basic 
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software avionic functions must be provided in the event of damage or power-loss 
situations to give the pilot the ability to perform basic flight and navigation functions. 
Obviously, this would be a major design driver for the software architect (Naegle & 
Petross, 2007). 
Primary Software Acquisition Problem Areas Addressed 
The primary problem areas addressed by FMECA include requirements 
clarification and prioritization, and helping to ensure a sound software architecture 
design. This analysis also ensures that the most critical software systems are 
designed with the requisite reliability and will continue to function in degraded 
modes.  
As previously stated, one of the main functions of performing FMECA is to 
identify those software functions that are not critical, and ensuring that failures or 
anomalies in those non-critical functions do not preclude or negatively affect system 
capabilities. Today’s systems typically have numerous enhancing functions that 
improve performance but are not critical and the software developers have no way to 
discern the difference between a critical system and an enhancing one without 
employing FMECA. 
Integrating the Recommended Tools, Techniques, and 
Processes into the Defense Acquisition System 
The tools, techniques, and processes were specifically selected for both their 
ability to address software-intensive systems development problems, and their ability 
to integrate with the DAS. They are all SEP enablers designed to improve the critical 
DAS front-end processes, which are primarily the Government’s responsibility. 
The depiction in Figure 5 shows the processes applied at the latest possible 
developmental time to be effective. The earlier these tools, techniques, and 
processes occur, the more effective they become. This representation also does not 
show the iterative cycles of QAW and ATAM or their overlapping nature. 
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Figure 5. Quality Attribution Workshop and Architectural Tradeoff Analysis 
Methodology Integration into Software Lifecycle Management 
(Naegle & Petross, 2007) 
As depicted in Figure 5 the QAW and ATAM are designed to address critical 
requirements and design front-end processes, where the Government is primarily 
responsible for the process. The blue arrow shows how the warfighters and user 
community are continuously involved throughout the process, and are active 
participants in the QAW and ATAM processes. This is distinctly different than the 
traditional DAS where there is little formal user interaction between preparation of 
the JCIDS documents and the prototype limited user tests (LUT)/early user test and 
evaluation (EUT&E). 
The user communities have a very significant role in driving the QAW and 
ATAM processes, which requires more user resources to support the system 
development. This user investment in the DAS is becoming more critical with the 
development of more software-intensive and complex systems of all kinds. This 
investment is absolutely necessary to avoid Government to contractor 
misunderstanding of the system requirements and warfighter expectations, and 
would significantly reduce the cost and schedule delays associated with user 
dissatisfaction, user-test failure, and unnecessary system redesign. 
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Program Management Risk Reduction 
These tools, techniques, and processes will not, of themselves, produce or 
guarantee anything. “An architecture analysis method, any architecture analysis 
method, is a garbage-in-garbage-out process. The ATAM is no different. It crucially 
relies on the active and willing participation of the stakeholders” (Kazman et al., 
2000, p. 63). All of the tools and techniques described and recommended in this 
research are dependent on the team of professional stakeholders conscientiously 
performing their critical function in the development of the software-intensive system. 
To effectively implement the recommended tools, techniques, and processes, 
the program management team must be professional, disciplined in their application 
of the SEP and skilled in integrating the tools into the DAS. In a word used by the 
SEI, the team must be mature. The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act 
(DAWIA) mandates certain education and training levels for the professional 
workforce performing at various levels. The DOD invests significant resources in 
both education and training to help ensure the acquisition workforce competencies 
and comply with the DAWIA. 
The DOD also evaluates the maturity of potential software developers by 
requiring an evaluation using SEI’s Capability Maturity Model–Integrated (CMMI; or 
equivalent) for most software-intensive system acquisitions. The CMMI is a five-level 
model, and the software developer organization under evaluation must achieve at 
least a level three by an independent evaluation team to be eligible to be awarded 
the DOD contract.  
As mentioned previously, the DOD does not currently require the PM offices 
managing software-intensive systems to achieve any maturity level on the Software 
Acquisition Capability Maturity Model (SA-CMM). The team effort between the 
Government and the software developer strongly suggests that both the PM office 
and the software developer would reduce developmental risk by demonstrating an 
appropriate level of maturity. 
Due in large part to the immature software engineering environment, each 
major DOD software design and build tends to be unique. That means that the 
software development in complex systems will act the same way as integrating a 
new technology would, and the resulting program risk is very high. The software 
TRLs have little meaning in this type of environment, so risk management is highly 
dependent on the Government and software development teams’ abilities to manage 
the system software development as a new technology with a low TRL. 
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A significant portion of the risk management is focused on the Government 
and software development teams. As the software TRLs are mostly ineffective, I 
would recommend the further development of software Management Readiness 
Levels (MgtRLs) to mitigate the risks. Part of the management risk reduction is 
already in place with the DAWIA requirements and the software developer maturity 
levels that must be achieved. Taking this further by including the PM office team 
maturity and integrating the tools, techniques, and processes recommended in this 
research, I have outlined the basic nine-tier software MgtRLs: 
• Level 1: PM team and software developers meet all professional 
certifications and adhere to DOD policy for achieving maturity levels. 
• Level 2: PM team has fully developed derived and implied 
requirements using a QAW approach. 
• Level 3: PM team has conducted a self-evaluation and meets the SA-
CMM level 2 criteria. 
• Level 4: Post contract award, the PM team conducted at least one 
iteration of ATAM. 
• Level 5: PM team conducts pre and post contract award ATAM 
iterations, and continues ATAM through the initial program design 
reviews. 
• Level 6: PM team has achieved level 2 in an externally conducted SA-
CMM evaluation. Software developer has achieved level 3 (or higher) 
in an externally conducted CMMI evaluation.  
• Level 7: PM team has achieved level 3 in an externally conducted SA-
CMM evaluation. Software developer has achieved level 3 (or higher) 
in an externally conducted CMMI evaluation.  
• Level 8: PM team has achieved level 4 in an externally conducted SA-
CMM evaluation. Software developer has achieved level 4 (or 5) in an 
externally conducted CMMI evaluation.  
• Level 9: PM team has achieved level 5 in an externally conducted SA-
CMM evaluation. Software developer has achieved level 5 in an 
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As with the TRLs, I would recommend that the target MgtRL for any PM office 
managing a software-intensive or complex system would be level 6 to help reduce 
management risk to an acceptable level. This is significantly more overall 
management maturity than what DOD prescribes today, but this research strongly 
indicates that this level would reduce the software-intensive system development 
risk. 
The MgtRLs suggested focus on the tools, techniques, and processes 
researched, but there is likely many other areas that could be researched and added 
into the nine-tier model. Areas including software metrics, quality assurance, 
software-oriented Integrated Product Teams (IPTs), contracting plans, and others 
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